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Abstract
We argue that rules and rule-following provide a key means of solving social
dilemmas by revealing information about individual willingness to cooperate,
thereby facilitating assortative matching and the exclusion of non-cooperative
types. Rules impose costs on prospective entrants to any group and ensure that
only those willing to pay such costs will join. To illustrate this point, we study
a novel, repeated common pool resource game in which current resource stocks
depend on resource extraction in previous periods. We show that for a suffi-
ciently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be
preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Behavioral tests of the model indicate that
favorable ecological characteristics are necessary but insufficient to encourage ef-
fective CPR governance. However, by screening and sorting individuals accord-
ing to their willingness to follow costly rules in an individual choice task, we
show that CPR groups composed of rule-followers are less likely to exhaust the
resource than both groups of rule-breakers and mixed-type groups.
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1 Introduction
Often the justification for any rule is sought in its value in solving some particular
problem. Thus, in most countries, motorists drive on the right side of the road to
solve a potentially deadly coordination problem, and societies impose punishments
for theft and other crimes to increase the relative costs of undesirable actions. We
argue that the plethora of social rules also serve a more subtle purpose: by observ-
ing whether an individual adheres to some rule, we readily gain information about
that individual’s willingness to cooperate. By excluding those individuals unwilling
to follow rules, groups screen out non-cooperators and are able to reap the bene-
fits of cooperation. Thus, the constant presence of rules in our daily lives and the
ready observability of others’ adherence to them together facilitate the resolution of
social dilemmas, which suggests an additional fundamental reason for the prevalence
of and high esteem for explicit (occasionally arbitrary) rules at every level of social
organization. Thus, any estimate of the social value of rules, which would typically
consider their instrumental value in solving particular coordination problems, should
also take into account their value as screening mechanisms for cooperative types.
We illustrate the screening function of rules by studying a novel common pool
resource (CPR) problem. CPR management is fraught with incentive issues. The
classic statement of the problem highlights the tension between individual and social
incentives for maintaining the stock of a renewable resource in the absence of well-
defined property rights (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Thus when property rights are
ill-defined, resources will be depleted because individuals lack incentives for preser-
vation. In her seminal book, Elinor Ostrom (1990) provides vivid accounts of com-
mon pool resource management in a variety of communities around the world. In-
triguingly, she observes great diversity in resource governance outcomes: while some
communities are able to sustain common resources for hundreds of years, through
changes in government, wars and natural disasters, others consistently fail despite
many attempts to design the appropriate governance institutions.1
To understand the sources of this diversity, Ostrom has proposed that CPRs be
understood as “social-ecological systems” in which multiple interacting factors in-
fluence successful resource governance (e.g. Ostrom, 2009). In general, these can be
grouped into two categories: 1) ecological characteristics of the resource system, like
the speed of re-growth of the resource or the number of users, and 2) social and behav-
1Among examples of successful sustainability of CPRs are huerta irrigation institutions in Spain and
common grazing fields and forests in the Swiss Alps. Among failures are fisheries in Turkey, Canada
and Sri Lanka as well as water management in some counties in South California.
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ioral factors that influence CPR usage. This paper combines theory and experiment
to understand precisely how social and ecological factors interact to influence the
sustainability of CPRs.
We develop a novel model of a dynamic, multi-player common pool resource
game that captures the effects of crucial ecological parameters on resource dynamics.
In our game individuals allocate productive efforts between a private, inexhaustible
outside option and an exhaustible common pool resource that yields larger per-unit
returns to effort. We solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium and show that
the optimal resource extraction strategy depends on the rate of resource regeneration.
In a finitely repeated game, for a sufficiently high regeneration rate, individuals main-
tain the resource indefinitely in equilibrium. Moreover, this strategy corresponds to
the Social Planner’s solution of the game. Thus, for a broad range of parameter con-
figurations, stocks of common pool resources will be preserved in equilibrium, and
there is no commons dilemma. However, below some threshold rate, individuals
will instead exhaust the resource, while a social planner would prefer to preserve the
resource indefinitely. The dependence of equilibrium behavior on ecological param-
eters of the model helps explain the prevalence of both successful and unsuccessful
management of common pool resources identified around the world (Ostrom, 1990,
2010).
To test our model of the CPR game, we report a series of laboratory experiments.
Well-known laboratory results in common pool resource environments suggest that,
when “individuals do not know one another, cannot communicate effectively, and
thus cannot develop agreements, norms, and sanctions,” groups are prone to over-
harvest resources in a manner broadly aligned with the classic statement of the com-
mon pool resource problem (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994, p. 319). However,
our model predicts that under some sets of parameters, groups of anonymous, so-
cially separated individuals will nevertheless avoid overharvesting and maintain the
resource indefinitely. Thus, we can test experimentally whether people respond to
different ecological parameters of the CPR system in the way predicted by our model.
As Ostrom (2010) notes, all CPR systems are inextricably bound to the social sys-
tems in which they are managed and exploited, and thus favorable ecological char-
acteristics may be necessary conditions without being sufficient to ensure success-
ful CPR management. It is an open question whether Nash equilibrium will pro-
vide an accurate depiction of behavior in dynamic CPR systems, and we have many
reasons to believe that observed behavior in an experimental implementation of the
model may deviate substantially from Nash predictions. Previous studies of social
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dilemmas report considerable behavioral heterogeneity, both across countries and
across individuals within a given country (e.g. Henrich et al. 2005, 2010; Ga¨chter,
Herrmann, and Tho¨ni, 2010; Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter, 2008; Fischbacher and
Ga¨chter, 2010).
Following Smith (2003), one way of understanding observed heterogeneity in so-
cial dilemmas is to conceive of various player types, where a player’s type can be
inferred from her actions. Previous research has demonstrated the efficacy of this
method, both that it is possible to identify consistent player types on the basis of ob-
served play (e.g. Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr, 2001; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith,
and Trouard, 2001; Houser, Keane, and McCabe, 2004; Kurzban and Houser, 2005)
and that sorting by type can encourage cooperation among the positively assorted
(e.g. Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe, 2007; Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith, 2007;
Wilson, Jaworski, Schurter, and Smyth, 2012). However, in previous research, types
were identified by observing play in the relevant game. From the point of view of
encouraging cooperation, it would be preferable to infer information about a player’s
type prior to observing play in the game—by then it may be too late.
With this in mind, our experiments allow us to identify a particular behavioral
trait, which we argue characterizes players’ types in social dilemmas, and which may
influence whether and/or how the dynamics of CPR usage diverge from the equi-
librium predictions. Specifically, following Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2012), we
identify types with an unrelated experimental task in which subjects are asked to fol-
low an arbitrary and costly rule. We identify our subjects as either rule-followers or
rule-breakers to test the hypothesis that rule-followers will be more inclined to pre-
serve the CPR than rule-breakers.
This idea has precedent in the economics of religion where Iannaccone (1992) also
makes the connection between rule following and cooperation. He argues that costly
rules imposed by religious communities on prospective members (e.g. dietary re-
strictions) serve as screening devices to deter entry by free-riders and promote coop-
eration within the community. Similar behavioral patterns have been implicated in
field studies of successful CPR systems, where rule-abiding individuals are able to
sustain CPRs. For example, Ostrom (1990) reports very little cheating and resource
overuse in communities that managed to sustain a common resource for many years.
People in such communities do not overharvest the resource even when monitoring
is nearly non-existent and there are huge benefits from overusage.2 Similarly, Tang
2For example, court records from one year in the 15th century Spain show that for 25,000 estimated
opportunities of water theft only 200 cases took place which gives the minuscule infraction rate of
3
(1994, p.229) shows that groups of individuals with a propensity to follow rules are
much more successful in sustaining their resources than groups without such propen-
sities.
These findings hint at the importance of assortative matching and the exclusion
of defectors to the successful management of CPRs, but in field studies it is difficult
to distinguish successful CPR management due to groups composed of cooperative
types from successes due to ecological factors. Here we report laboratory experiments
in which we can measure and control the type-composition of each CPR system: by
measuring rule-following proclivities of each subject, we can compare the behavior
of rule-followers and rule-breakers in a mixed population and we can assortatively
match subjects into groups with others of the same type to identify the impact of
group composition. In particular, in two treatments, we observe individuals’ rule-
following decision prior to their play in the CPR game, and we assortatively match
them without their knowledge into groups composed of similar individuals. In two
other treatments, individuals first play the CPR game in randomly assigned groups
and then we observe their willingness to follow the costly rule.
Ultimately, our results suggest an intimate relationship between ecological and
social factors in preserving CPRs. While favorable ecological conditions are necessary
for CPR sustainability, they are not sufficient in our behavioral experiments. Even un-
der favorable ecological conditions, when groups do not screen out non-cooperative
(rule-breaking) types, they may be unable to preserve CPRs. Our experiment reveals
that such screening can by performed by observing the willingness of prospective
entrants to follow rules and excluding those who are revealed to be unwilling. Thus,
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the CPR game and the
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (Section 2.1: one-shot stage game and its NE; Sec-
tion 2.2: finitely repeated game and its SPNE; Section 2.3: solution to the Social Plan-
ner’s problem), and in Section 2.4 we discuss our model in relation to other models
of CPRs. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results of
our experiments, and section 5 offers some concluding remarks. Appendices contain
proofs of the propositions, lemmata, the Social Planner’s problem with and without
a negative externality, description of variables used in the statistical analysis, addi-
tional experimental findings, and experimental instructions.
0.008. This is given that monitors could only check each household approximately once a year (Ostrom,
1990, p. 75).
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2 The Common Pool Resource Game
In this section we present a formal model of the Common Pool Resource (hereafter
CPR) game to highlight how the equilibrium resource extraction strategy depends on
ecological parameters.
2.1 One-Shot Game
We start with a description of the one-shot stage game. Suppose there is a resource
stock w > 0. There are n players who simultaneously choose how much effort to exert
in harvesting the resource. Each player i’s chooses effort ei ∈ [0, e¯] where e¯ > 0 is a
common maximum effort level that can be exerted by each player (e.g. hours worked
per day with constant productivity). Let E = ∑i=1..n ei denote the sum of all efforts.
The payoff function for player i is
pii(ei, e−i|w) =
e¯− ei + αei if w− E > 0,e¯− ei + αwn if w− E ≤ 0. (1)
The intuition behind pii is the following. For simplicity we assume that the amount of
the resource, efforts, and players’ utilities are all denominated in the same units. If the
sum of all efforts E does not exceed the available amount of the resource w then each
player i receives a return on effort equal to αei, where α > 1 ensures that players find
it worthwhile to exert effort harvesting the resource. The payoff in this case is e¯− ei,
the amount of effort not spent, plus αei, the return from exerted effort, or e¯+ (α− 1)ei.
If, however, the sum of harvesting efforts exceeds the resource stock, then all players
share the remaining stock equally, and the payoff is e¯ − ei + αwn .3 This finalizes the
description of the stage game. Hereafter, we will call any such game, parameterized
by w, a w-game.
Proposition 1. If w > ne¯ then the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the w-game is
ei = e¯ for all i = 1..n. If w ≤ ne¯ then the unique pure Nash Equilibrium of w-game is ei = wn
3We could also assume that after choosing their efforts, players start “eating” the resource with
the same “speed” and continue eating until either all have exerted the chosen effort or the resource
is exhausted. In this case, players who choose low efforts still receive αei if the resource is not fully
depleted, and only those who choose high effort end up sharing the remains. Under this alternative
specification our results are unchanged.
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for all i = 1..n.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2 Finitely Repeated Game
Next, we analyze the repeated w-game. Suppose that players make simultaneous
effort decisions in L consecutive periods. In each period they may choose to exert
effort ei up to some maximum effort e¯. Moreover, the resource stock in future periods
depends on the amount remaining after harvesting decisions made in the current
period. We assume that the resource naturally grows at a rate inversely proportional
to its current size. Furthermore, assume that due to exogenous environmental or
technical factors, there exists a maximum resource capacity w. Now, suppose that
after harvesting in period t− 1 the remaining resource stock is w∗t−1. Then, the stock
available before period t is w∗t−1 + β(w− w∗t−1)1w∗t−1≥τ. Here 0 < β < 1 is the growth
rate and 1w∗t−1≥τ equals 1 whenever w
∗
t−1 ≥ τ and 0 otherwise. The interpretation
is the following. The more depleted the resource w∗t−1 the faster the resource is able
to regenerate. The growth rate approaches 0 as the resource stock approaches w.
However, if the resource is depleted below some level τ  e¯, then the resource is
exhausted and no regrowth happens thereafter.
Now we can define the repeated w-game. Denote by Et = ∑i=1..n eit the sum of
efforts of all players in period t = 1..L. Suppose that before period 1 the stock of
the resource is w1. In period 1 players choose effort levels that determine E1 and,
consequently, the resource stock decreases to w∗1 = (w1 − E1)1w1−E1>0. This is the
amount of the resource left after period 1. Then a portion of the resource regrows, and
the stock becomes w2 = w∗1 + β(w¯− w∗1)1w∗1≥τ, which is the amount available at the
beginning of period 2. At this moment period 2 begins. Defining the same quantities
for all periods we get the resource stock available before period t > 1 to be
wt = w∗t−1 + β(w− w∗t−1)1w∗t−1≥τ
where w∗t = (wt − Et)1wt−Et>0.
Let Ht denote the set of all histories of effort choices in periods 1 through t. The
typical element of Ht is ht = ((ei1)i=1..n, ..., (eit)i=1..n). The history of choices ht defines
the sequence (Ek(ht))k=1..t of sums of efforts.4 This sequence in its turn generates
the sequence of resource stocks (wk(ht))k=1..t available before periods k as determined
4Here Ek(ht) denotes the sum of efforts in period k as defined by ht.
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by the recursive application of the resource growth formula above. The stage game
played in period t + 1 after history ht is (w∗t + β(w− w∗t )1w∗t≥τ)-game. The utility of
player i after terminal history hL is then defined by
L
∑
k=1
pii(eit, e−it|wk(hL)).
This completely defines the (history-dependent) repeated CPR game.
Now we turn to the equilibrium analysis of the finitely repeated CPR game. The
following proposition shows that there exists a symmetric Markov Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium in which players exert maximum effort e¯ in any period in which
doing so will not deplete the resource below τ. When the resource stock in period
t is wt < ne¯ + τ the equilibrium strategy is for all players to exert effort so that the
resource is depleted to exactly τ. Thus, the resource will be preserved indefinitely in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If β ≥ τ(n−1)w−τ and τ ≤ e¯ then the following strategy used by all players
constitutes a SPNE. In periods t = 1..L choose eit = e¯ if the resource before period t is
wt ≥ ne¯ + τ. In period t = 1..L− 1 choose eit = wt−τn if wt ∈ [τ, ne¯ + τ) and eit = wtn if
wt < τ. Choose eiL = min{e¯, wLn } if wL < ne¯ + τ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 gives us the following results:
Result 1. If w− 1−ββ ne¯ ≥ ne¯+ τ then the strategy stated in proposition 2 is a SPNE if
used by all players. Moreover, if w1 ≥ ne¯ + τ then on the equilibrium path all players
will exert effort e¯ in all periods. If w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯ + τ) players will exert effort e¯ in all
periods but the first, where they will put effort w1−τn . If w1 < τ then in period 1 all
players will exert effort w1n and 0 effort in the remaining periods.
Result 2. If w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯ + τ then the strategy stated in proposition 2 is a SPNE
if used by all players. Moreover, if w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯ + τ) players will exert effort w1−τn in
period 1; efforts β(w−τ)n in periods 2 to L− 1 and effort min
{
e¯, τ+β(w−τ)n
}
in period L.
If w1 ≥ ne¯ + τ and L < M then on the equilibrium path all players will exert effort e¯
in all periods.5 If w1 ≥ ne¯+ τ and L ≥ M then on the equilibrium path all players will
exert effort e¯ in periods 1 to M− 1 and efforts like in case w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯+ τ) afterwards.
5See Lemma 1 for the value of M.
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If w1 < τ then in period 1 all players will exert effort
w1
n and 0 effort in the remaining
periods.
The SPNE constructed above holds for relatively low values of τ (τ ≤ e¯) and/or
relatively high levels of β (β ≥ τ(n−1)w−τ ) because in those cases, the temptation to ex-
ert high effort so that the resource is depleted below τ, is overcome by the high re-
source growth resulting from exerting less effort today. However, if β is low, then this
trade-off disappears and the only SPNE is for all players to exert the highest possible
symmetric effort. The following proposition describes the result.
Proposition 3. If β ≤ τ(n−1)w−τ and τ ≤ e¯ then the following strategy used by all players
constitutes a SPNE. In all periods t = 1..L choose eit = min
{
e¯, wtn
}
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows equilibrium paths for different initial conditions and different
parameter combinations (as in the two propositions above). It can be easily seen
that for the assumptions of proposition 2 the resource stock converges to the level
τ + β(w− τ) and for the assumptions of proposition 3 the resource stock converges
to 0.
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Figure 1: Possible equilibrium paths for parameter assumptions in propositions 2 and
3. We display the paths for two different initial resource stocks w1: 360 and 120. The
growth rates (β) depicted here are exactly those from the experimental CPRL (0.25)
and CPRH (0.50) treatments (see Section 3).
An important observation about propositions 2 and 3 should be made. In the in-
teresting case w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯, where even with high w1, exerting efforts e¯ eventually
depletes the resource to a level less than ne¯ (so that resource can be depleted), for any
given parameters only one of the two SPNE described in the propositions above can
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occur.6 This is clear from the proofs of Case 2.1 of proposition 2 and the first case of
proposition 3: the restrictions on β (β ≥ τ(n−1)w−τ and β ≤ τ(n−1)w−τ correspondingly) are
equivalent to the no profitable deviation conditions. Therefore, our model predicts a
unique symmetric Markov SPNE for any set of parameters.7
Result 3. If β ≤ τ(n−1)w−τ and τ ≤ e¯ then the strategy stated in proposition 3 is a SPNE
if played by all players. On the equilibrium path players harvest e¯ if the resource is
higher than ne¯ and harvest 1/n fraction of the resource otherwise.
Thus, while in some cases, our model predicts overharvesting of CPRs in line with
the classic statement of the commons problem, we also find that in equilibrium for a
range of parameters, there is no commons dilemma. For a sufficient growth rate,
CPRs can be sustained indefinitely.
2.3 Social Planner’s Problem
In this section we consider the same problem from the perspective of a Social Planner
who seeks to maximize the sum of individual utilities in our CPR game. Without loss
of generality we will solve for the optimal harvesting strategy in the single player
case. In each period t, the social planner’s payoff is defined by the first part of equa-
tion (1):
pi(et|wt) = e¯ + (α− 1)et where 0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt}.
In what follows we will again abuse notation and assume that pi(et|wt) = et without
loss of generality.
Given the initial resource stock w1, a Social Planner faces the following problem:
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et (2)
s.t. wt+1 = wt − et + β(w− (wt − et))1wt−et≥τ
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt}.
Before proceeding to the Proposition describing the solution to this problem, let us
first make a useful observation. By Lemma 2 no solution to the above problem can
have wt < τ for t = 1..L − 1. Thus, we can simplify the problem by removing the
6Unless β = τ(n−1)w−τ so that players are indifferent between both SPNE.
7Apart from the case β = τ(n−1)w−τ when two equilibria exist.
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(never optimal) choices that lead to the case wt < τ:
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et (3)
s.t. wt+1 = wt − et + β(w− (wt − et)) = (1− β)(wt − et) + βw
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt − τ} for t = 1..L− 1
0 ≤ eL ≤ min{e¯, wL}.
The solution to problem (3) must be the same as to problem (2).
Now we are ready to find the solution.
Proposition 4. The following choice procedure generates the solution to the Social Planner’s
problem (2) as long as τ < e¯. In periods t = 1..L, et = e¯ if the resource before period t is
wt ≥ e¯ + τ. However, in period t = 1..L− 1, et = wt − τ if wt ∈ [τ, e¯ + τ) and et = wt if
wt < τ. If wL < e¯ + τ then eL = min{e¯, wL}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the Social Planner’s optimal plan precisely mimics the strategies of play-
ers in the SPNE of the game with a high resource regrowth rate as described in Propo-
sition 2 for all combinations of parameters. However, with a low regrowth rate, the
planner would prefer to sustain the resource while individuals rapidly deplete it in
equilibrium.8 Thus, for low growth rate CPR systems, this finding highlights the
tension at the heart of the commons problem and provides an additional benchmark
against which to compare behavior.
2.4 Comparison to Other CPR Models
Our model differs from the classical common pool resource games reported in pre-
vious literature (Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker, 1990; Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom,
1990; Walker and Gardner, 1992; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1994; Falk, Fehr, and
8One caveat is that, for the planner’s solution to correspond in this way, we must assume the ab-
sence of externalities associated with extraction of the resource. If, for example, some members of
society are not involved in resource extraction but value the resource stock for other reasons, then the
Social Planner’s solution will not correspond to the SPNE of the high-growth game. Suppose that the
resource is a forest in which some members of society enjoy hiking. In Appendix C we find the solu-
tion to the Social Planner’s problem with a negative externality of extraction. We assume that there
is some level of the resource η > τ such that if the resource is above that level then some additional
utility u is enjoyed by the society. Proposition 5 in Appendix C shows that in this case the optimal
solution is to deplete the resource to some level above τ so that the resource grows between periods to
exactly η. It is important to notice that this is true for all possible growth rates of the resource.
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Fischbacher, 2002; Velez, Stranlund, and Murphy, 2009). In the classical repeated CPR
game, the stage game payoff is defined by pii = e− xi + (xi/∑ xi)F(∑ xi), where F
is a concave function and xi is the amount extracted by player i. This models a situa-
tion in which each person’s resource extraction imposes a direct negative externality
on others. With this payoff function there is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game
where each player extracts some amount of the CPR, but it is not depleted (Walker
and Gardner, 1992). We adopt a more extreme version of payoffs so that the unique
NE of the stage game is to deplete the resource.
The most important difference between the classical model and ours is how the
game is repeated, and this feature explains why, despite the extreme predictions for
our stage game, we find that the CPR can be sustained in some equilbria. In the clas-
sical setup, the stage game in each period is the same. We think that this modeling
decision is rather restrictive, because this makes it impossible to study the effects of
resource growth from period to period on the equilibrium decisions. In our model
resource stocks replenish over time, so long as they are maintained above a certain
minimum. Therefore, our CPR game is a repeated game with a state variable that more
nearly captures features of naturally occurring CPRs such as fisheries, where resource
stocks are path dependent. Bru, Cabrera, Capra, and Gomez (2003) also consider a
CPR game where the resource stock in each period depends on the extraction deci-
sions in previous periods. However, their setup is also more restrictive: 2 players
move sequentially and can only choose between high or low extraction rates. In our
model the decisions of n players in each period are simultaneous, which may be more
realistic for certain types of CPR,9 and the amount extracted can be any real number.
It should be noted though, that qualitatively the model in Bru, Cabrera, Capra, and
Gomez (2003) has similar predictions to our model: in equilibrium the resource is
either depleted or is sustained depending on ecological parameters.
3 Experimental Design
As noted above, we test the predictions of our model in the lab, and we also explore
the impact of group composition on CPR sustainability. The experiment consists of
two decision-making stages and a questionnaire.
9For example, when fishermen decide how much fish to catch they do not know the decisions of
other fishermen who are at sea at the same time.
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3.1 Rule Following Task
In stage 1, which we call the Rule Following stage (RF), subjects control a stick fig-
ure walking across the computer screen (this task is drawn from Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov, 2012). Each subject makes 5 decisions concerning the amount of time
they wait at a sequence of red traffic lights, each of which will turn green 5 seconds
after their arrival. Figure 2 shows the screen that the subjects see.
Figure 2: Screen shot of the Rule Following stage.
The following description of the RF stage closely follows that in Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov (2012). At the beginning of the RF stage, the stick figure is standing at
the left border of the screen, and all traffic lights are red.10 Subjects initiate the RF
stage by pressing the START button. At this moment, the stick figure starts walking
towards the first traffic light. Upon reaching the first red light, the stick figure auto-
matically stops. The light turns green 5 seconds after the stick figure stops; however,
subjects are free to press a button labeled WALK any time after the stick figure stops.
When a subject presses WALK, the stick figure continues walking to the next red light
before stopping again, and subjects must once again press WALK to continue to the
next light. Throughout the RF stage, the WALK button is shown in the middle of
the screen. Subjects can press the WALK button at any time during the RF stage.
However, it becomes functional only when the stick figure stops at a traffic light.
Subjects receive an endowment of 8 Euro, and they are told that for each second
they spend in the RF stage they will lose 0.08 Euro. It takes 4 seconds to walk between
each traffic light, and 4 seconds from the final light to the finish. Therefore, all subjects
lose around 2 Euro walking, and if a subject waits for green at all 5 traffic lights, she
will lose an additional 2 Euro waiting. Thus the most a subject can earn in the RF stage
is 6 Euro (if she spends no time waiting at traffic lights), and the most she can earn
if she waits is 4 Euro (if she waits exactly 5 seconds at each light). In the instructions
10Before starting the task, subjects see a short cartoon in which the traffic lights blink from red to
green to ensure they understand that the lights can turn green.
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for the RF stage (see Appendix F) subjects are told: “The rule is to wait at each stop
light until it turns green”. No other information, apart from the payment scheme and
a general description of the walking procedure, is provided in the instructions.11
The rule following task instructs subjects to follow a familiar, arbitrary rule at
some cost to themselves. Obedience to this rule is in some ways “irrational” in the
sense that with no monitoring or penalties, there is no cost to breaking the rule. In our
experiment the typical justification for obeying traffic law is irrelevant because there
are no other drivers or pedestrians to protect or be protected from - this is similar to
a situation in which people wait at stoplights in the middle of the night, despite the
absence of other pedestrians or drivers. Why individuals are willing to incur costs
in service of a rule is an open question. More important for our purposes, we ar-
gue that the decision to follow costly rules reveals information about an individual’s
behavioral type: those who incur costs in order to follow rules implicitly identify
themselves as conditional cooperators or “team players”.
We test this hypothesis and the hypotheses derived from our model in two treat-
ments: the CPR game with high β (CPRH) and the CPR game with low β (CPRL).
Stage 1 of both treatments is the Rule Following task as described above. In stage 2
of both treatments subjects play 10 periods of a repeated CPR game in fixed groups
of 4.
3.2 CPR Experiment
Before making decisions in the RF stage, subjects only receive instructions for that
stage. In particular, they are aware that the experiment will consist of several stages,
but they know neither what they will do in the next stage(s) nor the connection be-
tween the RF stage and consecutive stages.12 Unknown to the subjects, their decisions
11If a subject asked what would happen if he/she passed through the red light, an experimenter
explained that all information relevant to the experiment is presented in the instructions.
12Specifically, subjects’ rule-following task instructions read “Part I” at the top of the page (see Ap-
pendix F). Some might be concerned that the foreknowledge of a second task will influence behavior
in the first task. However, as we noted in a prevous implementation of a similar experimental design
in Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2012):
In dictator game experiments, knowledge of the existence of an unspecified second-stage
has been shown to alter subjects’ behavior by making them more cooperative in expecta-
tion that their first-stage behavior may influence their second-stage reputation (Smith,
2008). If subjects are concerned for their reputation and thus wait longer than they
might in a treatment without an implicit “shadow of the future” (or, similarly, with a
double-blind protocol), this would dilute the information content of the rule-following
task, thereby strengthening our results.
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in the RF stage determine their group membership in the CPR game.
We employ the same matching procedure in both treatments. First, we randomly
divide subjects into groups of 8. Second, within each group of 8, we rank subjects
according to the total time they spent waiting at traffic lights—at least 25 seconds for
those subjects who waited for green at all traffic lights and close to 0 seconds for those
who did not wait at any traffic light. Then, in each group of 8, we separate the top 4
subjects (Rule-Followers) and the bottom 4 subjects (Rule-Breakers) into two groups
for stage 2. After we match subjects, there is no interaction between any groups of 4.
Subjects are not informed about the matching procedure, and they are told only that
they will now interact with a fixed group of three other participants (see Appendix
G).13
In the CPRL treatment the CPR game is played in each group of 4 subjects for 10
periods.14 Subjects are told that in each period they will collect 60 tokens from a group
account and a private account. Their decision is how many of these 60 tokens to take
from each account. Each token taken from the private account yields a return of 1
Euro cent per token. Whereas, each token taken from the group account generates a
return of 2 Euro cents. Token supply in the private account is unlimited, which means
that each subject can take as many tokens as she wishes from the private account
in each period (subject to the 60 token limit). However, the group account, from
which all four subjects can take tokens, has a limited capacity and initially contains
a total of 360 tokens. Whenever subjects take tokens from the group account, its size
diminishes by the sum of tokens taken. Before the next period, the group account
replenishes: if there are X tokens remaining, then next period the group account will
contain X+ β(360−X) tokens (here β is treatment dependent growth rate). However,
if the number of tokens remaining falls under 30 tokens, then the group account won’t
replenish. Finally, if subjects choose to take more tokens than there are in the group
account, tokens are divided according to the amounts subjects have chosen.15 Thus,
in CPRH treatment the parameters are as follows: w = 360, e¯ = 60, n = 4; β = 0.5,
τ = 30, α = 2, L = 10, M = 2. Notice that with these parameters we have
β >
τ(n− 1)
w− τ
13This is not deception since none of the statements in the instructions are false or misleading.
14Subjects are not informed how many periods of the CPR task they will perform. The instructions
in Appendix G specify that the game will be played for several periods. An indefinite ending point
should provide a best-case scenario for cooperation, regardless of treatment.
15See Appendix G for the exact rule of how tokens are divided among subjects in this case.
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which means that the SPNE is to preserve the resource indefinitly (see Proposition 2).
The CPRL treatment is the same as CPRH except one change. Here β = 0.25 and thus
is lower than in the CPRH treatment. This switches the sign of the inequality above
so that the SPNE is as depicted in Proposition 3 and the resource will be rapidly de-
pleted in equilibrium. To isolate the impact of varying β in the absence of sorting
we ran two additional treatments where the order of the tasks was reversed and sub-
jects were placed into groups at random (revCPRL and revCPRH). In appendix E we
also report an exponential growth treatment, where a different resource regeneration
function was used (CPREXP). Finally, at the end of the experiment, subjects filled
out the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Haidt, 2007), which provides estimates of
subjects concerns for 5 fundamental moral issues.
Overall, 88 subjects participated in the CPRH treatment; 96 subjects in the CPRL
treatment; 24 subjects in revCPRH; 32 subjects in revCPRL; and 56 in CPREXP (re-
ported in Appendix E). No pilots or other treatments were run. All experiments were
conducted at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEELab) at
Maastricht University in October-November 2011. Experiments were programmed
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3.3 Related Experiments
The pioneering CPR experiments are Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990), Walker,
Gardner, and Ostrom (1990), and Walker and Gardner (1992). Here 1) the stage game
has a NE which is close to social optimum and in which the CPR is not depleted,
and 2) there is no path-dependence of resource stocks on past choices. The main
finding is excess depletion of the resource. In our experiment the stage game has
a unique NE in which the resource is totally depleted; thus resource stocks may be
very difficult to sustain. More recent experiments with CPR games follow two main
paths: 1) asymmetric CPR games which mimic specific problems found in the field
(Ca´rdenas, Janssen, and Bousquet, 2011; Janssen, Anderies, and Joshi, 2011); 2) stud-
ies that investigate how different institutional arrangements influence CPR extrac-
tion (Ca´rdenas and Ostrom, 2004; Ca´rdenas, Janssen, and Bousquet, 2011; Rodriguez-
Sickert, Guzma´n, and Ca´rdenas, 2008); 3) studies that compare behavior to models of
various preference structures (Velez, Stranlund, and Murphy, 2009). All these studies
use the classical CPR game as introduced by Walker and Gardner (1992), which by the
static nature of the game does not allow them to answer questions related to resource
regrowth. Neither does any of them employ assortative matching.
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The experiment most similar to ours is the Forestry Game reported in Ca´rdenas,
Janssen, and Bousquet (2011). Analogously to our experiment the resource grows af-
ter each period. The growth is very slow and the resource is quickly depleted in all
groups. This is in line with our results: participants cannot sustain the resource with
low growth rates. Another experiment with resource regrowth is conducted by Bru,
Cabrera, Capra, and Gomez (2003). Their game is rather different from ours (players
move sequentially), but the authors also find overharvesting. A somewhat different
setup is used in Janssen, Holahan, Lee, and Ostrom (2010), where participants control
virtual avatars as they travel around an on-screen matrix and collect tokens, which
regrow with time. Overharvesting is immanent, however it is mitigated by communi-
cation and punishment. Janssen (2010) reports additional experiments using the same
experimental environment and exploring the effects of communication and punish-
ment on the endogenous creation of informal CPR management institutions under
different resource growth rates, and he reports that groups tend to preserve the re-
source successfully whether growth is high or low, in line with previous experiments
on the effects of communication and punishment on CPR management.
4 Experimental Findings
First, we compare the behavior of rule-breaking and rule-following groups in the
CPRH and CPRL treatments to the SPNE predictions and to one another. Then we
explore how individual differences in the willingness to follow costly rules drive in-
dividual behavior in the CPR game. Then, we examine behavior in our reverse treat-
ments to isolate the separate effects of ecology and the sorting mechanism on resource
extraction decisions.
4.1 CPRH Treatment
At the beginning of the CPRH treatment, subjects are divided into rule-breaking and
rule-following groups as described above. Average waiting times in rule-breaking
and rule-following groups are 14.76 and 27.79 seconds respectively.16 We first look at
the evolution of the resource stock in each group separately. Figure 3 displays time
series of resource stocks in each group of the CPRH treatment. The top row shows
rule-breaking groups, and the bottom row shows rule-following groups. Here, the
SPNE of the repeated game with CPRH parameters (β = 0.5) predicts that all groups
16See Figure E1 in Appendix E for histograms of waiting times by type and treatment.
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will sustain the resource for the full 10 periods, but the majority of groups exhaust
the resource rather early.
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Figure 3: Time series of resource stocks for individual groups in CPRH treatment.
The numbers in the middle of each panel indicate the period in which the group
exhausted the resource.
The numbers in the center of each panel specify the period in which the group ex-
hausted the resource. We denote this variable exhaustion.17 Among rule-followers,
4 out of 11 groups (36%) sustain the resource at or above the equilibrium level for all
10 periods, while among rule-breakers there is only 1 such group (9%). More gen-
erally, 45% of rule-following groups sustain some amount of the resource for all 10
periods while only 18% of rule-breaking groups did so. The rest of the groups devi-
ate from the SPNE prediction and harvest the resource until it is eventually depleted.
Nevertheless, a permutation test indicates that there is a significant difference in the
mean period of exhaustion between rule-followers and rule-breakers in the CPRH
treatment (means are 7.64 and 5.55, respectively; p-value = 0.041, one-sided test).
4.2 Cooperation and Coordination in the CPRH Treatment
In part the relatively low success rate in sustaining the resource can be attributed to
the complexity of the coordination problem in equilibrium. To sustain the resource
beyond period 2, 4 individuals must each expend effort less or equal to wt−τ4 . Since
17If the group never exhausts the resource, exhaustion is 10.
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all four seek to maximize their effort, there is a substantial probability that the re-
source capacity will fall below τ and the resource will be depleted, if even one subject
harvests a little bit more than wt−τ4 .
18 From Figure 3 it is clear that many groups
of both rule-followers and rule-breakers failed to solve this coordination problem.
Specifically, note the number of cases in which the resource stock falls from around
the equilibrium level at time t into the interval (0, τ) at time t + 1. In all such cases,
wt > ∑i∈I ei > wt − τ, which indicates that at least some subjects chose their effort
levels with the τ threshold in mind.
Moreover, if we compare rule-following to rule-breaking groups, restricting at-
tention only to those groups that depleted the resource below τ, we find that rule-
breakers tend to overshoot the τ-threshold by a significantly larger margin than rule-
followers. Let wj,k be the resource stock in group j at the beginning of the period k,
which is the period after which the total stock first fell below the τ-threshold. Then
xj = τ − wj,k is the amount by which a group overshot τ. The median value of xj
is 2.7 among rule-followers and 10.6 among rule-breakers, and a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test rejects the null hypothesis that x¯ f ollowers = x¯breakers in favor of the alternative hy-
pothesis that x¯ f ollowers < x¯breakers (W7,10 = 18, p-value = 0.053, one-sided test, means
are 7.3 and 12.8, respectively).
This provides evidence that resource depletion among rule-breakers has a differ-
ent source than among rule-followers. Specifically, rule-following groups often de-
plete the resource due to the difficulty of the coordination problem in equilibrium
and not necessarily because many individuals extract more than their wt−τ4 share of
the resource. On the other hand, rule-breaking groups tend to substantially overhar-
vest the resource, suggesting that they are less likely to try to preserve the resource in
the first place; that is, they do not even attempt to solve the coordination problem. As
additional evidence, Spearman’s test of rank correlation between x¯ and exhaustion
is negative and highly significant (ρ = -0.66. p-value = 0.003). In Section 4.3 below,
we also show that individual differences in rule-following correlate strongly with in-
dividual efforts to preserve the resource in all treatments.
4.3 CPRL Treatment
Now we compare behavior of rule-following and rule-breaking groups in the CPRL
treatment. Average waiting times in rule-breaking and rule-following groups are sim-
18Moreover, given that subjects’ effort choices were integer constrained, when (wt−τ4 mod 4) 6= 0,
the coordination problem is even more complicated.
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ilar to those observed in the CPRH treatment at 15.22 and 30.38 seconds, respectively.
However, in the CPRL treatment, all groups eventually exhaust the resource, which is
qualitatively consistent with the SPNE of the repeated game with CPRL parameters.
Strictly speaking, only 3 groups play the SPNE and exhaust the resource in 2 periods.
Instead, the majority of groups manage to sustain resource stocks at positive levels
for 3 or more periods, and many of the groups that deplete the resource exhibit be-
havior similar to that described in the CPRH treatment wherein the stock falls to just
below τ before being completely depleted in the following period. This indicates that
subjects understand the trade-off between consuming as much of the resource as pos-
sible today and withholding harvesting today to sustain yields over many periods,
and it suggests that some subjects seek to improve total social welfare by restraining
their harvest even in the CPRL treatment. We will return to this point later.
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Figure 4: Time series of resource stocks by group in the CPRL treatment. The numbers
in the middle of each panel indicate the period in which the group exhausted the
resource stock (exhaustion).
A permutation test indicates that there is no significant difference in the mean pe-
riod of exhaustion between rule-followers and rule-breakers in the CPRL treatment
(means are 4.5 and 4, respectively; p-value = 0.29, one-sided test). Here, given the
slow rate of resource regeneration (β = 0.25), subjects are unable to permanently
sustain the resource above the τ threshold, regardless of their type.19
In order to confirm that the change in β between treatments impacts behavior, we
19This is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that levels of cooperation across groups within
the same society are sensitive to ecological variables (Lamba and Mace, 2011).
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compare the distribution of exhaustion for rule-breakers and rule-followers across
treatments as well as the overall treatment difference. Permutation tests demon-
strate that all three comparisons are significant indicating that the mean period of
exhaustion is later in the CPRH treatment, consistent with the comparative statics
predictions of the model. Rule-breakers in CPRL versus CPRH treatment: p-value
= 0.060, one-sided test; Rule-followers: p-value = 0.006, one-sided test; all groups by
treatment: p-value = 0.001, one-sided test.20
Thus we find compelling evidence that behavior in the CPR game is sensitive to
ecological characteristics of the resource system and to the behavioral type-composition
of groups. The following three findings summarize our main results on the separate
and joint role of social and ecological variables on successful CPR management:
Finding 1. In the CPRH treatment half of rule-following groups sustain the resource
as the SPNE predicts. However, contrary to the SPNE prediction the remaining rule-
following groups and almost all rule-breaking groups deplete the resource. There is a
significant difference between rule-breakers and rule-followers.
Finding 2. In the CPRL treatment all groups eventually exhaust the resource, though
it takes them longer than 2 periods and thus behavior deviates from the SPNE. There is
no significant difference between rule-breakers and rule-followers.
Finding 3. As predicted by the model, differences in the resource regeneration rate,
β, lead to significant differences between the CPRL and CPRH treatments. Comparing
rule-breakers and rule-followers across treatments and comparing all groups in each
treatment, the mean period of exhaustion is later in the CPRH treatment.
4.4 Reverse Treatments
In order to disentangle the effects of the our social and ecological treatment variables,
we examine group dynamics in mixed-type groups composed of both rule-breakers
and rule-followers. Thus we describe results from two additional control treatments
in which we reverse the order of the tasks. We call these reverse treatments, revCPRH
and revCPRL. These experiments are identical to the main treatments, except that
20Further evidence that low growth rates impede sustainability of the resource is provided by our
CPREXP treatment in which growth rate was exponential (reported in Appendix E.2). An exponential
regrowth function implies that growth is low for low resource stocks and high for high stocks, which
is opposite to the CPRL and CPRH treatments. Subjects in all but one group of the CPREXP treatment
(both rule-breaking and rule-following groups) exhaust the resource rather quickly, which is similar to
the CPRL treatment.
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subjects first play CPR game in randomly matched groups of 4, and then they par-
ticipate in the RF task. These treatments further allow us to distinguish the effects of
individual differences and our sorting mechanism based on the rule-following task.
Figures 5 and 6 show group dynamics in the revCRPH and revCPRL treatment.
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Figure 5: Time series of resource stocks in the revCPRH treatment.
First note that the dynamics in the 6 groups of the revCPRH treatment are qual-
itatively similar to those observed in the main CPRH treatment in that most groups
do not immediately deplete the resource, and one sustains it for the entire 10 periods.
However, we can weakly reject the hypothesis of equal mean periods of exhaustion
between rule-following groups in the CPRH treatment and the revCPRH treatment
(means are 7.64 and 5.17, respectively, one-sided permutation test, p-value = 0.066).
The same test fails if we compare rule-breaking groups in the CPRH treatment (mean
5.55) with revCPRH (p-value = 0.395). This indicates that the presence of rule-
breakers offsets the beneficial impact of rule-followers so much that mixed-type groups
are indistinguishable from rule-breaking groups. However, through screening and
assortative matching, groups of rule-followers can substantially improve CPR man-
agement.
Observed behavior in the revCPRL treatment is roughly the same as in the main
CPRL treatment, and permutation tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal
mean exhaustion when comparing revCPRL to either rule-followers or rule-breakers
21
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Figure 6: Time series of resource stocks in the revCPRL treatment.
in the CPRL treatment (p-values = 0.801 and 0.422, respectively, two-sided tests).
Again, the reason for this is the low regeneration rate. Though, we still see that all
but one group sustains the resource longer than predicted in the SPNE. This can be
attributed to some attempts to preserve the resource, as discussed in the previous
section.
Table 1 summarizes the means of exhaustion in all treatments. One can see that
mean exhaustion in both revCPRH and revCPRL is lower than in the CPRH treat-
ment and is closer to the CPRL treatment. Since revCPRH and revCPRL treatment
groups consist of a mixture of rule-breakers and rule-followers, this analysis sup-
ports our hypothesis that only the absence of rule-breakers allows groups to sustain
the resource in the CPR game. This finding is similar to that reported in Kimbrough
and Vostroknutov (2012) in which play by mixed-type groups is indistinguishable
from that of groups composed solely of rule-breakers in both voluntary contribution
public goods experiments and trust games, and we provide further evidence that
rule-following proclivity predicts conditional cooperation.
Finding 4. In the reverse treatments group dynamics are indistinguishable from the dy-
namics of rule-breaking groups in the corresponding main treatments. Rule-following
groups in the CPRH treatment sustain the resource longer than revCPRH groups. This
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Mean exhaustion
CPRH CPRL revCPRH revCPRL
Rule-Breakers 5.55 4.00
Rule-Followers 7.64 4.50
NoSort 5.17 4.75
Table 1: Mean values of exhaustion across all treatments.
supports our hypothesis that assortative matching of rule-followers is essential for sus-
taining the resource.
4.5 Individual Behavior
Subjects in the CPR game are driven by two mutually incompatible goals. First, there
is the desire to harvest as much of the resource as possible now, in case the resource
is exhausted and unavailable in the future; indeed, contrary to the SPNE prediction,
in practice this is a concern even in the CPRH treatment. Second, there is a forward-
looking desire to sustain the resource, so it can replenish and be consumed in the
future (and this tendency is present even in the CPRL treatment where the SPNE
predicts rapid exhaustion). In the CPRH treatment, these motivations are aligned in
equilibrium as the solution to the Social Planner’s problem corresponds to the SPNE,
but in the CPRL treatment the goals are in conflict.21 In practice, the path of the
resource stock will depend on which of these two goals dominates in the population,
and we argue that the goals are associated with individuals of particular types.
In Section 4.2 we showed that rule-following groups in the CPRH treatment of-
ten deplete the resource not because they extensively over-harvest the resource, but
rather because they often fail to solve the complicated coordination problem in equi-
librium. Rule-breaking groups on the other hand, tend to substantially over-harvest
the resource. To understand the mechanisms underlying these differences at an in-
dividual level we estimate a mixed effects logistic regression in which we analyze
time series of individual choices for all subjects in the CPRH, CPRL, revCPRH, and
revCPRL treatments. In particular, we are interested in choices that reveal an individ-
ual’s willingness to show restraint and attempt to preserve the resource. We argue
that an individual’s choice reveals restraint whenever she chooses to take less than
(or equal to) her “share” of the resource stock as defined by the Social Planner’s so-
21In both the CPRL and CPRH treatments the solution to the Social Planner’s problem is identical to
the SPNE in high-β cases like the CPRH treatment (see Section 2.3). Thus, it could be argued that some
subjects in the CPRL treatment strive to maximize total social surplus, rather than individual payoffs.
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lution to the CPR game, given the current level of the resource (see Section 2.3). We
define the dummy variable restraint which is defined for any harvesting effort (e)
in any period and any current resource stock w. Let eˆw be the optimal effort choice
according to the Social Planner’s solution to the CPR problem for any given w. Then
restraint = 1 if e ≤ eˆw. In particular, if w ≥ ne¯ + τ = 270 then restraint takes a
value of 1 if e ≤ e¯ = 60;22 if w < ne¯ + τ then restraint takes a value of 1 as long
as e ≤ (w− τ)/n; and restraint is 0 otherwise. We exclude observations in which
0 ≤ w ≤ τ since in such cases the resource has already been depleted. We use a
dummy rather than, say, the total deviation from one’s “share” because this treats
the decision equally for all resource stocks and allows us to normalize interpretation
across treatments.
The dependent variable, restrainti,t, indicates whether subject i showed restraint
in period t and captures the tension between individual and social incentives. In ad-
dition to a constant term, our independent variables include: 1) breakeri, a dummy
indicating whether subject i waited less than 25 seconds in the RF task; 2) CPRH, a
dummy for the CPRH treatments; 3) Reverse, a dummy for the Reverse treatments
and 4) others restrainti,t−1, measuring whether other group members, on aggre-
gate, showed restraint in the previous period. This last variable allows us to esti-
mate the reciprocal response of each subject to the actions of other subjects in their
group. We also include an interaction term that allows us to parse the effects of
the reciprocity variable more subtly. Specifically, a breaker·others restrainti,t−1
variable allows us to identify whether the types reciprocate in different ways or to
different degrees.23 Moreover, random effects for each subject-in-group control for
repeated measurements at the subject and group level. Table 2 displays the results.
The regression output in column (1) reports the estimated coefficients on our
variables of interest, and column (2) reports marginal effects estimated at observed
means. First, note that a positive and significant coefficient on the CPRH treatment
dummy indicates that subjects respond to higher growth rates with more attempts
to preserve the resource. More importantly, a negative and significant coefficient on
breaker indicates that rule-breaking individuals are 27% less likely to show restraint
than rule-following individuals. Moreover, both types exhibit significant reciprocal
responses (a positive and significant coefficient on others restrainti,t−1 indicates
that restraint is met with restraint and lack thereof with lack thereof), an insignificant
22Note that this condition will always be satisfied; this is true because the Social Planner would
always prefer to harvest ne¯ when there is no risk of depleting the resource. We cannot simply exclude
these observations, though, because our regression employs a lagged variable.
23See Appendix D for the definitions of all variables.
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(1) (2)
restraint marginal
CPRL, CPRH, revCPRL, revCPRH effects
breaker –1.234∗∗∗ –0.255∗∗∗
(0.450) (0.093)
others restraintt−1 1.261∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.073)
breaker·others restraintt−1 0.723 0.150
(0.484) (0.101)
CPRH 1.257∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.463) (0.093)
Reverse 0.037 0.008
(0.518) (0.107)
Constant 0.241
(0.389)
Log Lik. –456.960
N 856 856
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Mixed effects logistic regression of individual differences in restraint and
average marginal effects. Random effects for each group and subject. 856 observa-
tions, 240 subjects, 60 independent groups.
interaction between breaker and others restrainti,t−1 would appear to indicate that
there are no differences in the reciprocal response between rule-followers and rule-
breakers are more strongly reciprocal. However, this coefficient measures both posi-
tive and negative reciprocity, and this fact explains why rule-breaking groups tend to
deplete the resource more quickly: in this case, rule-breakers are matched with other
rule-breakers who are less likely to show restraint in the first place. Reciprocity gen-
erates a negative feedback loop whereby rule-breaking groups quickly deplete the
resource via negative reciprocal responses to lack of restraint by others. On the other
hand, when rule-breakers are matched together with others who are more likely to
show restraint, this produces positive feedback, and thus rule-following groups tend
to preserve the resource. Thus, differences in the rule-following type-composition of
the group explain differences in CPR management dynamics.
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Finding 5. Overall, rule-breakers show less restraint than rule-followers. Both
types respond reciprocally to the behavior of others, and as a result, groups that contain
rule-breakers rapidly deplete resources due to negative reciprocity.
4.6 Heterogeneity in Rule-Following
Unreported regressions replicate the findings of Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2012)
that women are more likely to follow the rule than men and Law students are more
likely to break the rule than others. We observe no differences across individuals of
different nationalities, but we draw our subjects from a relatively homogeneous pool,
mostly composed of western European individuals. We also find no evidence that
subjects’ moral foundations scores are correlated with rule-following proclivity.
5 Discussion
We report experimental tests of a model of the classic common pool resource problem.
Our model maintains the features that are typically argued to generate overharvest-
ing of a common pool resource, but we show that depending on the regeneration
rate of the resource, individuals may actually preserve the resource indefinitely in
equilibrium.
Data from laboratory experiments supports the comparative statics predictions
of the model when we compare behavior under two parameter configurations, one
in which the resource is sustained in equilibrium and one in which it is exhausted.
Nevertheless, individuals destroy the resource more frequently than predicted in the
former case and maintain it for longer than predicted in the latter. We show that this
behavior also varies with the behavioral-type composition of the group. Specifically,
groups composed of rule-breakers are more likely to exhaust the resource than groups
of rule-followers, and this is driven by increased impulsivity (lack of restraint)
among rule-breakers and by negative reciprocity in response to observed lack of re-
straint.
While our model helps to account for the diversity of outcomes in common pool
resource management around the world, our experimental results show that subtle
differences in group composition can also have large impacts. This finding highlights
the crucial role of screening, exclusion and assortative matching in the preservation
of CPRs, and it reiterates the point that ecological factors are merely permissive and
not prescriptive of any observed form of social organization (Algaze, 2005), thereby
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providing additional support for the social-ecological systems view of CPRs.
Successful resolution of social dilemmas requires screening out non-cooperative
types, and we argue that one way of identifying those types is to observe their will-
ingness to follow costly rules. When individuals choose to pay costs in order to bind
themselves to rules, their actions reveal willingness to cooperate and a far-sighted
view of the utility of rules that makes them valuable group members. Crucially, this
behavioral tendency is revealed ex ante in the decision not to follow the rule, and thus
our daily experience provides copious information about the cooperative tendency of
others, even when we are unable to directly observe their decision to cooperate.
Thus more generally, the screening function of rules may help explain a wide va-
riety of observed practices in which groups impose costs on their members. Military
organizations, religious orders, gangs, and other groups often require prospective
members to make large sacrifices as part of the process of joining the group. Such
costs are justified if they allow group leaders to identify cooperative types and screen
out likely defectors. Moreover, by simply observing the willingness of others to fol-
low rules, we have a mechanism by which we can easily identify prospective partners
for any cooperative enterprise.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. If w > ne¯ it is obvious that only the first case in the definition of pii
can occur, or pii(ei, e−i) = e¯ + (α− 1)ei. Therefore, since α > 1, the only strictly undominated
action is ei = e¯ for all i which results in the proposed NE. N
If w ≤ ne¯ then the following cases are possible. First, suppose that E < w, thenpii(ei, e−i) =
e¯ + (α− 1)ei for all players which implies that any player i can profitably deviate by increas-
ing her effort a little bit so that the sum of efforts is still less than w. Second, suppose that
E > w, then pii(ei, e−i) = e¯− ei + αwn for all players which implies that any player i can prof-
itably deviate by decreasing her effort a little bit so that the sum of efforts is still higher than
w. Therefore, in any NE it should be the case that E = w.
Now suppose that E = w. Then no player i wishes to increase her effort as it would lower
her payoff. However, it is possible that player i might profitably deviate by decreasing her
effort ei by small amount ε. In this case instead of payoff e¯ − ei + αwn she will get e¯ + (α −
1)(ei − ε). For this deviation to be unprofitable it must be the case that
e¯ + (α− 1)(ei − ε) ≤ e¯− ei + αwn ∀ε > 0.
This inequality obviously holds if and only if e¯ + (α− 1)ei ≤ e¯− ei + αwn or ei ≤ wn .
Thus any NE should satisfy two conditions: 1) E = w; and 2) ei ≤ wn for all i = 1..n. This
is only possible if ei = wn for all i. 
∗ ∗ ∗
Proof of Proposition 2. 24 The proof consists of several cases. However let us make some
observations beforehand. First, suppose that the amount of resource before some period is
w > ne¯ + τ. Then, even if all players choose maximal effort e¯, the available amount of the
resource at the beginning of the next period will actually be higher than in the previous period
as long as w− ne¯ + β(w− (w− ne¯)) = (1− β)(w− ne¯) + βw ≥ w. This can be rearranged to
w ≤ w− 1−ββ ne¯. This means that for any values of the resource less than the right hand side
even if all players choose maximal efforts the next period resource will be higher than original
one. Notice that RHS can be negative (if β or w is low). This means that for some combinations
of parameters, the above statement will never hold. Second, for values w > w− 1−ββ ne¯ if all
players exert maximum effort, then the amount of the resource before next period will drop.
However, if
w− 1− β
β
ne¯ ≥ ne¯ + τ (4)
then even if w is above the threshold w− 1−ββ ne¯, all players can exert full effort e¯ and still have
access to a resource level greater than ne¯ + τ next period. To see this rearrange inequality (4)
24In the proof we will slightly abuse notation. Remember that utility in each period of repeated
game is defined in equation (1). Since in almost all cases in the proof we will only use the first part of
the utility which is pii(ei, ·) = e¯ + (α− 1)ei, we will drop e¯ and α− 1 and think of utility as just being
pii(ei, ·) = ei. This does not change any results.
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to get
τ + β(w− τ) ≥ ne¯ + τ. (5)
The LHS of this inequality is the amount of resource available following periods in which the
resource was harvested so that the remaining quantity was τ, the minimum level at which the
resource will regrow. This inequality says that even if the resource level reaches τ, regrowth
will ensure that enough of the resource is available in the following period for all players to
exert the maximum effort, e¯.
Case 1.1: w− 1−ββ ne¯ ≥ ne¯+ τ and w1 ≥ ne¯+ τ.
As was described above, if before period 1 w1 ≥ ne¯+ τ then players can exert maximal efforts
after all histories in all periods until the end of the game. Moreover, inequality (5) guarantees
that after no history will the amount of resource available be below ne¯ + τ. The strategy
proposed in this Proposition has all players choosing e¯ after each history. This is a SPNE since
choosing e¯ gives all players the maximum attainable payoff in each period.
Case 1.2: w− 1−ββ ne¯ ≥ ne¯+ τ and w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯+ τ).
If w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯ + τ) then in period 1 players choose ei1 = w1−τn and then choose e¯ in all consec-
utive periods. According to the “one-stage-deviation principle” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
Theorem 4.1) we should only check for deviations in period 1 (again because in all other pe-
riods players have maximal payoffs). In period 1 player i can increase that period’s payoff by
choosing effort ei1 = w1−τn + ε, where 0 < ε < τ.
25 After this (and assuming all other players
stick to the original strategy) the resource will drop to level τ− ε, thus creating no growth af-
terwards. Therefore, following the strategy in all consecutive periods i will get w1−τn + ε+
τ−ε
n .
The last term here represents the payoff in second period. This deviation is not profitable as
long as
w1 − τ
n
+ ε+
τ − ε
n
≤ w1 − τ
n
+ (L− 1)e¯.
To check whether this holds for all deviations ε let us take a limit of the LHS to get the maxi-
mum possible deviation:
lim
ε↑τ
w1 − τ
n
+ ε+
τ − ε
n
=
w1 − τ
n
+ τ ≤ w1 − τ
n
+ (L− 1)e¯.
This holds whenever τ ≤ (L− 1)e¯ which is true by assumption of the Proposition. Therefore,
the above strategy constitutes a SPNE.
Case 1.3: w− 1−ββ ne¯ ≥ ne¯+ τ and w1 < τ.
Finally if w1 < τ then no growth will happen in the game. In period 1 player i exerts effort
w1
n . By choosing more effort she will be worse off in period 1 and still get 0 in all consecutive
periods. She can also deviate by choosing less effort: w1n − ε. However, in this case her payoff
will be w1n − ε+ εn . Where the last term corresponds to the payoff in period 2. It is clear that
this deviation is not profitable. Profitable deviations in periods other than 1 are impossible
because w2 = ... = wL = 0. Thus we have a SPNE. N
Next we analyze the case in which w − 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯ + τ. Notice that, analogously to
inequality (5), we have now τ+ β(w− τ) < ne¯+ τ. This implies that if after some period the
25Notice that decreasing effort in period 1 cannot increase player i’s payoff since she will still get
maximal utility from putting effort e¯ in all following periods.
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amount of resource is τ, then before next period the growth of the resource will be insufficient
to allow all players to choose e¯ without depleting the resource.
Case 2.1: w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯+ τ and w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯+ τ).
Assume that w1 ∈ [τ, ne¯ + τ). Then, given the above observation, if players follow the strat-
egy given in this Proposition they should choose effort eit = wt−τn in periods 1 through L− 1
and eiL = min{e¯, wLn } in the last period. Let us check that there are no possible one period
deviations from this strategy. On the proposed path player i gets payoff
w1 − τ
n
+ k
(1− β)τ + βw− τ
n
+min
{
e¯,
(1− β)τ + βw
n
}
(6)
where k = L− 2.
Player i might deviate by exerting less effort: w1−τn − ε. In this case new payoff is
w1 − τ
n
− ε+ (1− β)(τ + ε) + βw− τ
n
+(k− 1) (1− β)τ + βw− τ
n
+min
{
e¯,
(1− β)τ + βw
n
}
.
This is a decreasing function of ε which equals to the on-the-path payoff if ε = 0.26 Thus
decreasing effort in period 1 is not profitable. This reasoning does not depend on number of
periods k, therefore, the same logic can be applied to any period from 2 to L− 1 to show that
decreasing effort is not profitable. In period L all players play NE of the stage game therefore
no deviations can occur there either.
Let us now check if player i could gain by increasing effort in period 1. Deviation gives
the payoff w1−τn + ε+
τ−ε
n which is an increasing function of ε. Therefore the best deviation is
given by the limit of this expression when ε→ τ which is
w1 − τ
n
+ τ.
In order for the deviation to be unprofitable this must be less then or equal to the on-the-path
payoff in expression (6) for all values of k. Expression (6) increases in k, therefore the most
constraining case is k = 0.
Deviation, thus, is unprofitable whenever (after rearranging given k = 0)
τ ≤ βw
β+ n− 1 and τ ≤ e¯ (7)
Both inequalities hold by the assumption of the Proposition. Therefore we have a SPNE.
Case 2.2: w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯+ τ and w1 ≥ ne¯+ τ and small L.
Now let us assume that w1 ≥ ne¯ + τ. It is clear that at least in period 1 all players can exert
effort e¯ and not deplete the resource below level τ. In general, by Lemma 1 with W = ne¯ + τ
if all players exert effort e¯ in all periods then there exists M ∈ N such that for all k < M,
wk ≥ ne¯ + τ and for all k ≥ M, wk < ne¯ + τ. Therefore, if L < M then all players will receive
the maximum payoff e¯ in each period, which implies the absence of profitable deviations.
26If ε is so big that before second period the resource is above ne¯− τ, then everyone will exert effort
e¯ which still makes this payoff function decreasing in ε.
34
Thus, if L < M then in SPNE all players put in effort e¯ in all periods.27
Case 2.3: w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯+ τ and w1 ≥ ne¯+ τ and large L.
If, however, L ≥ M then there are periods at the end of the game in which the size of the
resource falls below ne¯ + τ if all players exert effort e¯ in periods before Mth. The strategy in
this Proposition says that players should put in effort e¯ in periods 1 through M − 1; put in
effort wk−τn in periods k = M..L− 1; and effort min{e¯, wLn } in period L. By Case 2.1 above we
know that no single period deviations are possible in periods M through L. Thus, it is only
left to check single deviations in periods 1 to M− 1.
First, let us make an observation. By Lemma 1 we know that in periods 1 to M the size
of the resource before period t is defined by wt = (1− β)wt−1 + βc, where c = w− 1−ββ ne¯.28
Suppose that in some period t the amount of the resource increases by some ε: w′t = wt + ε.
Then in period t + 1 the changed amount of the resource will be w′t+1 = (1− β)w′t + βc =
wt+1 +(1− β)ε. Analogously, w′t+k = wt+k +(1− β)kε. Therefore, an ε increase in the resource
in period t increases the resource in period t+ k by (1− β)kε as long as all players exert effort
e¯ in the interim periods.
Now consider a small reduction in effort in period M − 1 by player i keeping the pre-
scribed strategy of the rest of the players fixed. Remember, by construction, wM−1 ≥ ne¯ + τ
and wM < ne¯ + τ. Suppose player i decreases his effort in period M− 1 from e¯ to e¯− ε with
very small ε. This, as described in the previous paragraph, will lead to change in wM: it will
become wM + (1− β)ε. Now, as long as wM + (1− β)ε ≤ ne¯ + τ the strategy prescribes all
players to choose effort wM+(1−β)ε−τn . Since after this the resource level will fall to τ, the intro-
duction of small εwill not have any effect on the payoffs in periods M+ 1 onwards. Therefore,
ε changes the overall payoff of player i by −ε+ (1−β)εn < 0. So we might conclude that it is
not worthwhile for player i to decrease her effort by the amount ε if wM + (1− β)ε ≤ ne¯ + τ.
However, this is not enough to conclude that no single deviation in period M− 1 is pos-
sible because a larger decrease in effort could also be profitable. For example, if player i
chooses ε > ε1 where ε1 satisfies wM + (1− β)ε1 = ne¯ + τ. As ε > ε1 we still have resource
level wM + (1− β)ε in period M. Now though wM + (1− β)ε > ne¯ + τ, which means that
player i in period M should choose e¯ regardless of ε. This in its turn implies that now wM+1
will start changing to wM+1 + (1− β)2ε. Overall change in payoff at ε1 as was noticed above
was −ε1 + (1−β)ε1n < 0. As ε grows above ε1 the payoff in period M stays fixed at e¯, thus not
influencing the difference in overall payoffs. However, the change in period M+ 1 now takes
effect and creates an overall change in payoff for ε > ε1 to be−ε+ (1−β)
2ε
n < 0 as long as ε < ε2
which satisfies wM+1 + (1− β)ε2 = ne¯ + τ. Thus a larger deviation resulting from choosing ε
above ε1 is even less profitable.
We can extend this argument and construct ε3, ε4, etc. tracking the change in overall
payoff to see that the more ε increases the more negative the overall change in payoff becomes.
Therefore we can conclude that decreasing effort in period M− 1 for player i is not profitable.
Now suppose that player i decreases effort in period M − 2 and it becomes e¯ − ε. As a
result, the resource level in period M − 1 will become wM−1 + (1− β)ε. But since in period
M − 1 player i already exerts effort e¯, an increase in the resource level will have no effect
on the payoff in period M − 1. However, an ε change in M − 2 will increase the resource
size to wM + (1− β)2ε in period M. Using the argument developed above, for ε ≤ ε′1 which
27See Lemma 1 for the exact formula for M in terms of the parameters of the model.
28If players stick to the strategy prescribed by this Proposition.
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satisfies wM + (1− β)2ε′1 = ne¯ + τ, the overall change in payoff will be −ε+ (1−β)
2ε
n < 0. For
ε > ε′1 the argument goes exactly as before and demonstrates that in period M − 2 it is also
not profitable to deviate from the prescribed strategy. Analogous arguments can be given for
all periods k = 1..M− 3.
We showed that there exists no single period deviation in any period by which player i
can profitably deviate from the strategy given in the Proposition. Therefore we have a SPNE.
Case 2.4: w− 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯+ τ and w1 < τ.
Same as Case 1.3. 
∗ ∗ ∗
Proof of Proposition 3. Some observation first. Notice that the restrictions on τ in this
Proposition imply
(1− β)τ + βw ≤ nτ ≤ ne¯. (8)
Moreover, the following equivalence holds:
(1− β)τ + βw ≤ ne¯ ⇐⇒ w− 1− β
β
ne¯ ≤ ne¯− 1− β
β
τ < ne¯. (9)
Case w1 ∈ [nτ, ne¯).
Here w1 ≥ nτ which implies that one player can deviate from the strategy described in the
Proposition (choose w1n ) so that resource is depleted to the level at least τ. On (proposed) equi-
librium path payoff in this case is w1n and the deviation payoff is
w1
n − (τ+ ε) + (1−β)(τ+ε)+βwn .
Here one player exerts effort w1n − (τ + ε) instead of prescribed w1n . It is clear that deviation
payoff decreases in ε, thus the best deviation payoff is w1n − τ + (1−β)τ+βwn . Notice that due
to (8) players can deplete the resource to zero in the second period after deviation, so no min
operator on (1−β)τ+βwn is required. No deviation occurs if (after rearranging) τ ≥ βwβ+n−1 , ex-
actly as assumed in the Proposition. Since the resource is depleted after at most 2 periods the
same logic can be used for deviations in any period t = 1..L− 1 as long as wt ∈ [nτ, ne¯).
Case w1 ∈ (0, nτ).
Here no player can deviate in period 1 so that the resource reaches the level where it can grow
next period. Exerting ε less effort in period 1 gives payoff w1n − ε+ εn . This is decreasing in ε,
thus no profitable deviation is possible. The same logic works in any period t = 1..L− 1 with
wt ∈ (0, nτ).
Case w1 ∈ [ne¯,w].
This case is analogous to Cases 2.2 and 2.3 of Proposition 2. Notice first that equivalence
(9) guarantees that w − 1−ββ ne¯ < ne¯. Thus, by Lemma 1 with W = ne¯ if all players exert
effort e¯ in all periods then there exists M ∈ N such that for all k < M, wk ≥ ne¯ and for all
k ≥ M, wk < ne¯. Therefore, if L < M then all players will receive the maximum payoff e¯
in each period, which implies the absence of profitable deviations. If L ≥ M then the same
construction as in Case 2.3 of Proposition 2 (together with two cases above in this proof)
guarantees the absence of profitable deviations. 
∗ ∗ ∗
Proof of Proposition 4. We employ an induction argument on the sequence of value func-
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tions constructed by working backwards from the last period. Let us restate the maximization
problem:
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et
s.t. wt+1 = (1− β)(wt − et) + βw
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt − τ} for t = 1..L− 1
0 ≤ eL ≤ min{e¯, wL}.
Consider the value function which by Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1957)
should characterize the solution in period L:
VL(w) = maxe e
s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w}.
Obviously, VL(w) = min{e¯, w} which implies that VL(w) = e¯ if w > e¯ and VL(w) = w if
w ≤ e¯. Thus, VL is a weakly increasing piecewise linear continuous function with slope 0 or 1.
Now consider the value function VL−1 : [τ, w]→ R for period L− 1:
VL−1(w) = maxe e +VL(w
′)
s.t. w′ = (1− β)(w− e) + βw
0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w− τ}.
For any fixed w the maximand e +VL((1− β)(w− e) + βw) is an increasing piecewise linear
continuous function of e because VL((1− β)(w− e) + βw) is a decreasing function of e with
slopes −(1− β) or 0. Thus, the solution to the maximization problem is given by the maxi-
mum e possible. Therefore, if w ≤ e¯ + τ, we have VL−1(w) = w− τ+min{e¯, (1− β)τ+ βw},
and if w > e¯ + τ, then VL−1(w) = e¯ +min{e¯, (1− β)(w− e¯) + βw}. Plugging w = e¯ + τ into
these two definitions we can easily see that VL−1 connects at VL−1(e¯ + τ) = e¯ + min{e¯, (1−
β)τ + βw}. Since both definitions of VL−1 are weakly increasing we can conclude that VL−1
is weakly increasing continuous piecewise linear with slopes 1, 0 and possibly 1 − β (if e¯ >
(1− β)(w− e¯) + βw). Notice that the optimal e here is the same as described in this Proposi-
tion.
Now we are ready to formulate the induction argument. VL−2 is given by
VL−2(w) = maxe e +VL−1(w
′)
s.t. w′ = (1− β)(w− e) + βw
0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w− τ}.
Again, e + VL−1((1 − β)(w − e) + βw) is an increasing function of e, thus the optimal e is
the maximum one.29 If w ≤ e¯ + τ, we have VL−2(w) = w − τ + VL−1((1− β)τ + βw), and
if w > e¯ + τ, then VL−2(w) = e¯ + VL−1((1 − β)(w − e¯) + βw). Again, the two pieces of
VL−2 connect at VL−2(e¯ + τ) = e¯ + VL−1((1− β)τ + βw), and since both pieces are weakly
increasing and continuous, we conclude that VL−2 is weakly increasing continuous piecewise
29This is because the slopes of VL−1 do not exceed 1.
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linear with slopes: 1 (first piece) and some slopes that do not exceed 1− β (second piece).
Notice that in this argument we used only two properties of VL−1: 1) that it is weakly
increasing continuous; 2) that it is piecewise linear with slopes not exceeding 1. Thus, since
we found that VL−2 enjoys both of these properties, the same argument can be used to show
that for any k > 2
VL−k(w) = maxe e +VL−k+1(w
′)
s.t. w′ = (1− β)(w− e) + βw
0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w− τ}
is a weakly increasing continuous piecewise linear with slopes not exceeding 1. By the Princi-
ple of Optimality the sequence of functions (Vt)t=1..L characterizes the solution to the problem
(3) and consecutively to the problem (2) if τ < e¯. This, in its turn, implies that choices of et are
as described in the Proposition. 
B Lemmata
Lemma 1. Suppose c := w− 1−ββ ne¯ < W and w1 ≥ W. If in each period k ≥ 1 all players exert
effort e¯ then there exists M ∈ N such that for all k < M, wk ≥ W and for all k ≥ M, wk < W.
Moreover, M = 1+
⌈
log1−β
W−c
w1−c
⌉
.
Proof. Suppose before period 1 the amount of the resource is w1. If all players exert effort e¯
then before period 2 the amount of resource will be
w2 = (1− β)(w1 − ne¯) + βw = (1− β)w1 + β
[
w− 1− β
β
ne¯
]
.
Analogously, if players continue exerting effort e¯, the amount of resource at the beginning of
period t will be
wt = (1− β)wt−1 + β
[
w− 1− β
β
ne¯
]
.
Let c = w− 1−ββ ne¯. Then we can rewrite the difference equation above as wt = (1− β)wt−1 +
βc. This difference equation has a unique solution of the form
wt = C(1− β)t + c
where C = w1−c1−β depends on the initial conditions (in our case w1). By assumption of the
Lemma C > 0. It is clear that limt→∞ wt = c < W. Therefore, there exists a period M such
that wM < W. Moreover, wt is strictly decreasing sequence, thus the conditions of the Lemma
are satisfied. To find M solve for t in C(1− β)t + c = W. It gives
M = 1+
⌈
log1−β
W − c
w1 − c
⌉
.
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The logarithm is well defined by the assumptions of the Lemma. 
∗ ∗ ∗
Lemma 2. For any solution to Social Planner’s problem (2):
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et
s.t. wt+1 = wt − et + β(w− (wt − et))1wt−et≥τ (10)
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt}
it is true that wt ≥ τ for all t = 1..L− 1 whenever w1 ≥ τ and τ < e¯.
Proof. Suppose (et)t=1..L is a solution to the problem (2) and suppose that for some k ≤ L− 1
the size of the resource is wk ≥ τ and wk+1 < τ. By condition (10) this implies that wt < τ
for all future periods t > k + 1 as resource growth is not possible anymore. For any solution
(et)t=1..L, it will then be true that
L
∑
t=k+1
et = wk+1
as “eating” less than that amount would be not optimal. This also implies that ∑Lt=k et = wk
(by (10)).
Suppose now that a player exerts effort ek = wk − τ instead of wk − wk+1 in period k
and in period k + 1 she consumes as much as possible: min{e¯, (1 − β)τ + βw}. Then the
payoff from period k on is at least wk − τ +min{e¯, (1− β)τ + βw}, which is wk + e¯− τ > wk
or wk + β(w − τ) > wk. In both cases this is higher than the original continuation payoff
wk. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to exert effort wk − wk+1 in period k reducing size of the
resource below τ. 
C Social Planner’s Problem with a Negative Externality
In this section we consider a modified Social Planner’s problem. We assume that when the
resource is depleted below some level, continuing to harvest the resource imposes a negative
externality. We assume that there is a level η > τ such that if in period t the resource is
above η then society’s utility in period t becomes et + u where u > 0 represents the benefit to
the society from having sufficient resource stock to satisfy non-harvesting individuals. Thus
Social Planner’s problem is then:
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et + u1wt≥η (11)
s.t. wt+1 = wt − et + β(w− (wt − et))1wt−et≥τ
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt}.
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Since by assumption η > τ, Lemma 2 applies to this maximization problem exactly as it did
to the problem (2). Therefore, we can rewrite problem (11) as
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et + u1wt≥η (12)
s.t. wt+1 = (1− β)(wt − et) + βw
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt − τ} for t = 1..L− 1
0 ≤ eL ≤ min{e¯, wL}.
Let w∗ = η−βw1−β + e¯ and w∗ =
η−βw
1−β . Then the following Proposition characterizes the
solution to problem (11).
Proposition 5. Suppose that τ < w∗ < w and τ < w∗.30 The choice procedure that generates the
optimal solution in problem (11) is the same as in problem (2) except that in each period t = 1..L− 1
there exists a non-empty interval [at, w∗] with at ≥ τ such that et = wt − w∗ for all wt ∈ [at, w∗].
Proof. See below in this Appendix.
Notice that removing two assumptions of the Proposition (τ < w∗ < w and τ < w∗) does not
change the final conclusions regarding the optimal choice procedure. The only difference is
that without these assumptions some parts of the proof become unnecessary.
Now we will characterize what happens on the optimal path of problem (11). Proposition
5 says that on the optimal path, maximal effort e¯ or the effort that reduces the next period
resource stock to (1 − β)τ + βw will be chosen in all periods with the exception of those
periods in which the previous period’s resource stock lies in the interval wt ∈ [at, w∗]. In those
cases, effort is chosen so that the next period resource level is η. Since (at)t=1..L−1 depend on
the exact shapes of the value functions in each period, it is hard to provide an exact formula
for each at. However, it is possible to estimate maximal values of at. Consider equation (15)
from the proof:
vt−1(w) = max
{
w− η − βw
1− β +Vt(η), e¯ +Vt((1− β)(w− e¯) + βw)
}
.
It characterizes the continuous part of the value function in the interval of resource levels
w ∈ [w∗, w∗). We know from the proof that at is either the resource level where two functions
inside the max operator intersect or is equal to w∗. Therefore, the minimum possible at is
w∗ = w∗− e¯ and the maximum possible at is attained if e¯+Vt((1− β)(w− e¯)+ βw) is constant
in w and intersects w− η−βw1−β + Vt(η). Inequality (16) then shows that maximal at is w∗ − u.
Therefore, in any period t the length of the interval [at, w∗] is min{u, e¯}.31
The length of the interval [at, w∗] (in which the optimal choice is to harvest the resource so
that the next period’s resource stock is equal to η) is important for the optimal path that will
be followed. If this interval is sufficiently small (e.g. if u → 0), then the optimal path will be
very similar to the path of problem (2). On the other hand, if the length is e¯, then the optimal
30These assumptions guarantee that the most general case of the problem is considered.
31However, depending on the parameters it may be the case that w∗ is very close to τ. In this case
at = τ and the length of the interval is w∗ − τ. In interesting cases though we will have at > τ and the
length will be min{u, e¯}.
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path will converge to η from some period until the end of the game as long as initial w1 is big
enough. To see this consider three cases.
Case (1− β)τ+ βw > η and u > 0
Here η is so small that even if the resource falls to the level τ, next period it will regrow to
be larger than η. This implies that whatever the initial conditions are, the resource stock will
always remain above η.
Case (1− β)τ+ βw ∈ [w∗, η] and u ≥ e¯
Here the optimal path will either reduce the resource level to η and remain there until the
last period or will at some point exceed η and remain greater than η until the last period.
Notice first that u ≥ e¯ implies that in any period the length of the interval [at, w∗] is e¯ (or
at = w∗). Also notice that even if the resource falls to τ after some period it will grow to
(1− β)τ + βw > w∗ next period thus necessitating the jump to η in the subsequent period.
If η ∈ (w∗, w∗] then
(1− β)τ + βw ≤ η ⇔ η − e∗(η) ≥ τ
where e∗(η) = η − w∗ is the optimal choice at η. This equivalence means that once the level
of the resource is η, it will remain there since at this level, the optimal choice is feasible. The
resource stock will always end up at level η at some point and the planner will continue to
harvest so that it remains there. This is because: 1) for w1 ∈ [τ, w∗), the next period resource
level will be (1− β)τ+ βw ∈ [w∗, η] and thus η in the subsequent period; 2) for w1 ∈ [w∗, w∗],
the next period resource level will be η; 3) for w1 > w∗ the resource level will eventually be
reduced into the interval (w∗, w∗] since
η ≤ w∗ ⇔ η ≥ w− 1− β
β
e¯ ⇔ w∗ ≥ w− 1− β
β
e¯,
and w− 1−ββ e¯ is the precise resource level such that, by exerting effort e¯ above it, the planner
will always reduce the next period resource level, so that it converges to w− 1−ββ e¯ (see Lemma
1 with n = 1).
If η > w∗ then at some point, the resource level will increase above η and will remain
above it until the final period. Indeed,
η > w∗ ⇔ η < w− 1− β
β
e¯.
This means that for w1 ∈ [τ, η] the resource stock will increase towards w− 1−ββ e¯, necessarily
passing through the interval [w∗, w∗], since its length is e¯. This implies that the resource stock
will be equal to η at some point. Once η is reached, the optimal choice will be e∗(η) = e¯.
But by definition of w∗ (see proof of Proposition 5) for any resource w > w∗ even if effort e¯
is exerted, the next period resource level will be greater than η. Thus, since η > w∗ at some
point, the resource level will always remain greater than η. Thus, for w1 > η > w∗ the next
period resource (and all others until the end) will remain above η for the same reason.
Case (1− β)τ+ βw < w∗ and u ≥ e¯
In this case the resource level will either drop to (1− β)τ + βw or behave as in the previous
case. As before we have at = w∗ for all t and, since (1− β)τ + βw < w∗, if w1 ∈ [τ, w∗) the
resource will stay at level (1− β)τ + βw < w∗ < η until the end of the game (last inequality
is true since w∗ < η ⇔ η < w always holds).
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If η ∈ (w∗, w∗] then
(1− β)τ + βw < w∗ ⇒ η − e∗(η) > τ
where e∗(η) = η−w∗. Thus, as before, if resource falls into the interval (w∗, w∗] it will stay at
level η until last period. The rest of the argument for η ∈ (w∗, w∗] and η > w∗ is the same as
in the previous case excluding values w1 ∈ [τ, w∗).
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 4. Let
us restate the maximization problem:
max
(et)t=1..L
L
∑
t=1
et + u1wt≥η
s.t. wt+1 = (1− β)(wt − et) + βw
0 ≤ et ≤ min{e¯, wt − τ} for t = 1..L− 1
0 ≤ eL ≤ min{e¯, wL}.
The value function that characterizes the solution in period L is
VL(w) = maxe e + u1w≥η
s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w}.
Clearly, VL(w) = min{e¯, w} for w < η and VL(w) = min{e¯, w} + u for w ≥ η. VL(w) is
piecewise linear weakly increasing function with slopes 1 and 0 and with discontinuity at
w = η. Let us write VL(w) = vL(w)+ u1w≥η where vL(w) = min{e¯, w} is continuous “part” of
VL.32 Notice that vL is equal to the analogous function in the proof of Proposition 4. Therefore,
the choice procedure prescribed by VL is the same as in Proposition 4 (u1w≥η doesn’t play any
role here).
Consider now the value function VL−1 : [τ, w]→ R for period L− 1:
VL−1(w) = maxe e + u1w≥η +VL(w
′)
s.t. w′ = (1− β)(w− e) + βw
0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w− τ}.
Here u1w≥η is constant for each given w. Therefore, the function
vL−1(w) = maxe e +VL(w
′) (13)
s.t. w′ = (1− β)(w− e) + βw
0 ≤ e ≤ min{e¯, w− τ}.
is a candidate for the continuous part of VL−1.
Now we will show two things simultaneously: 1) that vL−1 is continuous and 2) that op-
timal choices of effort for different w correspond to those described in this Proposition. Con-
32The notation Vt(w) = vt(w) + u1w≥η will be used throughout the proof.
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sider first the levels of the resource w satisfying (1− β)(w− e¯) + βw ≥ η. We can rearrange
this to get w ≥ η−βw1−β + e¯ = w∗.33 For all these levels w ≥ w∗ it is true that if w is the amount
of the resource before period L− 1, then, even if maximal effort e¯ is exerted, in period L the
amount of the resource will be higher than η. This implies that VL(w) = vL(w) + u for all
w ≥ w∗ in problem (13). This in turn means that for all w ≥ w∗ the optimal choices of effort
will coincide with analogous choices in the proof of Proposition 4: all that changes is added
constant u. Moreover, vL−1(w) restricted to w ≥ w∗ is continuous by Proposition 4.
Using the same argument, consider levels of the resource w such that (1− β)w + βw < η.
These levels w are such that even if no effort is exerted in the current period, next period the
amount of the resource will be less than η. We can rewrite this as w < η−βw1−β = w∗.
34 For
all w ∈ [τ, w∗) it is then true that VL(w) = vL(w). Thus, for all w ∈ [τ, w∗) the optimal
choices are the same as in the analogous problem in Proposition 4. Moreover, vL−1 restricted
to w ∈ [τ, w∗) is continuous by Proposition 4.
Now let us find optimal choices for w ∈ [w∗, w∗). First, consider the maximand function
e+VL(w′) in (13) when w = w∗. For w = w∗, w′ ranges in the interval [η, (1− β)w∗+ βw] as e
changes from 0 to e¯.35 Thus, e +VL((1− β)(w∗ − e) + βw) is a continuous, strictly increasing
function of e as VL restricted to [η, (1− β)w∗ + βw] is weakly increasing with slopes no more
than 1 and continuous. Now let us perform the same analysis for w = w∗ − ε where ε is
sufficiently small positive number. For w = w∗− ε, w′ ranges in the interval [η− (1− β)ε, (1−
β)w∗ + βw− (1− β)ε] as e changes. Thus, the maximand function
m(e; ε) = e +VL((1− β)(w∗ − ε− e) + βw) (14)
increases strictly and continuously as e goes from 0 to e¯ − ε, then has a discontinuous drop
of size (1− β)u, and then increases again strictly and continuously as e goes from e¯ − ε to
e¯.36 Given ε small enough the optimal effort choice will be at e∗ = e¯ − ε or such that (1−
β)(w∗ − ε − e∗) + βw = η which gives e∗ = w∗ − ε − η−βw1−β = w − η−βw1−β as described in
the Proposition. More importantly though, this argument shows the existence of an interval
[aL−1, w∗) of levels of the resource (some range of small enough ε) such that e∗ = w− η−βw1−β
for all w ∈ [aL−1, w∗). Notice that this implies that effort e∗ in this interval is chosen so that
the amount of the resource before period L is exactly η. It is also easy to observe that vL−1(w)
is continuous on the interval (w∗ − ε, w∗ + ε) as limε→0 e∗ = e¯.
Before continuing let us make an observation about the function m(e; ε). It consists of two
increasing continuous functions with a discontinuous drop at e = e¯− ε. This implies that the
maximum of m(e; ε) can occur in only two places: at e = e¯− ε or at e = e¯. As shown above,
this implies that for w = w∗ − ε we have either e∗ = w − η−βw1−β or e∗ = e¯ on the interval
w ∈ [w∗, w∗). Thus we can rewrite vL−1(w) on w ∈ [w∗, w∗) as
vL−1(w) = max
{
w− η − βw
1− β +VL(η), e¯ +VL((1− β)(w− e¯) + βw)
}
. (15)
33Such w’s might not exist for some combination of the parameters. However, in this Proposition
we assume that they do (τ < w∗ < w). This is in order to consider the most general case.
34Again, by the assumption made in this Proposition such w′s exist.
35By the assumption of this Proposition τ < w∗ = w∗ − e¯. Thus, at w = w∗ it is possible to exert full
effort e¯ resulting in w′ = η for e = e¯.
36The last claim is due to the fact that VL(w) is weakly increasing and continuous with slopes no
more than 1 for w < η.
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It is easy to see that vL−1(w) is the maximum of two continuous functions in w where the
left function has slope 1 and the right function has slope no more than 1− β. Moreover,
lim
w↑w∗
w− η − βw
1− β +VL(η) = e¯ + vL(η) + u > (16)
> lim
w↑w∗
e¯ +VL((1− β)(w− e¯) + βw) = e¯ + vL(η)
Thus, as w goes to w∗ the function w− η−βw1−β + VL(η) may intersect the function e¯ + VL((1−
β)(w− e¯) + βw).37 If the functions intersect, then we define aL−1 as the resource level at the
intersection. Below aL−1 the optimal choice is e¯. If the functions do not intersect then we
define aL−1 = w∗ since we know from the above that below w∗ the optimal choices are like
in Proposition 3. The alternative representation, (15) also makes it easy to see that vL−1 is
continuous at aL−1 whichever way it is defined.
Combining the above observations, we can conclude that vL−1(w) is a weakly increasing,
piecewise linear continuous function. To complete the argument, we must show that the
slopes of vL−1 do not exceed 1. Indeed, we showed that this is the case for w ≥ w∗ and
w ∈ [τ, aL−1). On the interval [aL−1, w∗] we have vL−1(w) = w − η−βw1−β + VL(η) which has
slope 1.
Since vL−1(w) is a weakly increasing and continuous with slopes no more than 1, we can
conclude that VL−1(w) takes the same form, apart from the discontinuity at w = η. Thus,
VL−1(w), as well as VL(w), is weakly increasing and continuous with slopes no more than 1
with discontinuity at w = η. In the proof above only these properties of VL(w) were used.
Therefore, by induction, all the functions V1(w), V2(w), ...VL−2(w) have similar characteristics
and optimal choices. 
37Whether this intersection occurs depends on the parameters.
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D Variables Used in the Regressions
Variable Range Definition
exhaustion [1, 10] The number of period in which a group exhausted
the resource
breaker 1/0 Is 1 if subject spent less than 25 seconds waiting at
the traffic lights in the RF task
CPRH 1/0 Is 1 if CPRH treatment
restrainti,t 1/0 For subject i in period t. For w ≥ 270 is 1 if the
effort is less than or equal to 60; for w ∈ (30, 270) is
1 if the choice is less than or equal to (w− τ)/n =
(w− 30)/4
others restrainti,t−1 1/0 Is 1 if others showed restraint in the group of
subject i in period t− 1
Reverse 1/0 Is 1 if Reverse treatment
Table 3: Variables used in the regressions.
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E Additional Experimental Findings
E.1 Histograms of Waiting Times
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Figure E1: Histograms of total waiting time in RF task by group type in CPRL and
CPRH treatments.
E.2 Exponential Growth Treatment
As an additional control, we explore how resource dynamics depend on the particular choice
of resource regeneration function. In the 4 treatments discussed in this article, the resource
regeneration function was proportional to the deviation from resource capacity so that the
resource grew from level w, after harvesting choices were made in period t, to w + β(w− w)
at the beginning of period t + 1. Thus, growth is high for low stocks of the resource and is
vanishing as the resource converges to w.38 We wanted to see how group dynamics would
change when we instead introduced an exponential growth function, where total capacity is
unbounded. We substituted the “concave” growth above by “convex” one: w→ w + w2 . This
growth function has the opposite properties: growth is low for low levels of the resource and
high for high levels, and we refer to this as the CPREXP treatment.
Similar to our observations in the CPRH and CPRL treatments, rule-followers wait an av-
erage of 26.4 seconds during the RF task, while rule-breakers wait 13.6 seconds on average.
Figure E2 displays time series of resource stocks for both rule-followers and rule-breakers
38This type of growth is inherent to many natural systems, for example, populations of fish. When
the fish population is small, there is plenty of food available and population grows very fast. As
the population gets very large the growth stops, since there are natural limits on the amount of food
available.
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Figure E2: Time series of resource stocks in the CPREXP treatment, for Rule-Followers
and Rule-Breakers.
in the CPREXP treatment. With the exception of one group, both rule-following and rule-
breaking groups in CPREXP treatment exhaust the resource in about the same number of
periods as groups in CPRL treatment (means are 4.57 and 4.42 for followers and breakers,
respectively), and permutation tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean period
of exhaustion when comparing either rule-followers or rule-breakers across the treatments
(p-values = 1 and 0.766, two-sided tests). As was discussed above, CPRL groups exhaust
the resource relatively quickly because of the lower growth rate as compared to the CPRH
treatment. This problem is even more pronounced in the CPREXP treatment since the growth
rate declines as the resource stock declines. Thus, we find that rule-followers in the CPREXP
treatment exhaust the resource more quickly than their counterparts in the CPRH treatment
(two-sided permutation test, p-value = 0.019). Rule-breakers on the other hand show no sig-
nificant differences (p-value = 0.392, two-sided test).
Finding 6. Exponential growth does not encourage groups to sustain the resource because
growth is slow when the stock of the resource is small. CPREXP groups are statistically in-
distinguishable from CPRL groups and rule-breaking CPRH groups, but exhaust the resource
significantly faster than rule-following CPRH groups.
47
F Instructions for the Rule Following Stage
General information
You are now participating in a decision making experiment. If you follow the instructions
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your decisions and
the decisions of the other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you in CASH at the end
of the experiment
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then
we will come to your seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you
immediately from the experiment and all payments. The research organization METEOR has
provided funds for conducting this experiment.
Part I
In Part I of this experiment, you control a stick figure that will walk across the screen.
Once the experiment begins, you can start walking by clicking the “Start” button on the left
of the screen. Your stick figure will approach a series of stop lights and will stop to wait at
each light. To make your stick figure walk again, click the “Walk” button in the middle of the
screen.
The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green.
Your earnings in Part I are determined by the amount of time it takes your stick figure to walk
across the screen. Specifically, you begin with an initial endowment of 8 Euro. Each second,
this endowment will decrease by 0.08 Euro.
This is the end of the instructions for Part I. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand and an experimenter will answer them privately. Otherwise, please wait quietly for the
experiment to begin.
G Instructions for the CPR Game
Part II
This part of the experiment will consist of several decision making periods. In each period,
you will collect 60 tokens. Your task is to decide whether to take these tokens from either or
both of two accounts: a private account and a group account.
Each period you receive the sum of your earnings from your private account plus your
earnings from the group account.
There are 4 people, including yourself, participating in your group. You will be matched with
the same people for all of Part II. Other people in your group will make the same decisions
as you. You share the group account with other members of your group (and only with them
and no one else).
Each token you take from the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you
alone) of one cent (0.01 Euro).
Tokens taken from the group account yield a different return. For each token you take from
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the group account, you will receive a cash return of two cents (0.02 Euro).
The private account has an unlimited number of tokens that you can take, so it will never run
out of tokens. However, the group account initially contains a total of 360 tokens. This is the
capacity of the group account.
Whenever any person in your group takes tokens from the group account, the number of
tokens is reduced. However, each period, some of the tokens taken from the group account
will replenish. Specifically, they will replenish according to the following rule:
If there are X tokens remaining in the group account at the end of a period, the group account
will replenish (360 - X)/4 tokens. Thus, at the beginning of the next period, there will be X +
(360 - X)/4 tokens in the group account.
BUT if the total number of tokens in the group account ever falls to fewer than 30 tokens, the
group account will not replenish.
Finally, if at any point, the group attempts to take more tokens from the group account than
actually remain in the account, the remaining tokens will be divided across the people who
chose to take from the group account, and the group account will not replenish.
Here are three examples to make this clear:
(1) Suppose that at the beginning of the period, there are 360 tokens in the group account.
Then, suppose the people in your group, including yourself, take a total of 200 tokens from
the group account. At the end of the period, there would be 360 - 200 = 160 tokens remaining
in the group account.
The group account would then replenish before the next period. Specifically, (360 - 160)/4 =
50 tokens would be added back to the group account.
So, at the beginning of the next period, there would be 160 + 50 = 210 tokens in the group
account.
(2) Now, suppose the next period begins with 210 tokens in the group account, and suppose
that the people in your group take 200 tokens from the group account. At the end of the
period, there would be (210 - 200) = 10 tokens in the group account.
However, since 10 < 30 the group account would not replenish, and there would only be 10
tokens in the group account at the beginning of the next period.
(3) Now, suppose the next period begins with 10 tokens in the group account. Then suppose
that one person in the group attempts to collect 10 tokens from the group account, one person
attempts to collect 2 tokens, and the other two people only collect from the private account.
Since there are only 10 tokens to collect, the two people who attempted to take from the group
account would split the tokens according to the following rule. The first person would collect
1 token, and the second person would collect 1 token. Then the first person would collect
another token, and so would the second person. Now the second person has collected all the
tokens he/she chose to collect, so the first person would collect the remaining 6 tokens. In
this case, the first person would get a total of 8 tokens from the group account, and the second
person would get 2 tokens. They would then collect the rest of their tokens from the private
account.
Each period proceeds as follows:
First, decide on the number of tokens to take from the private and the group accounts by
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entering numbers into the boxes labeled private and group. Your entries must sum to 60.
While you make your decision, the 3 other members in your group will also decide on how
many tokens to take from the private and group accounts.
Second, after everyone has made a decision, your earnings for that decision period are the
sum of your earnings from the private and group accounts.
As an example, suppose that you take a total of 30 tokens from the private account and 30
tokens from the group account. Your total earnings from that period would be 30 + 30*2 =
90 cents. Remember, the return from the group account is 0.02 Euro per token and the return
from the private account is 0.01 Euro per token.
While you are deciding how to allocate your tokens, everyone else in your group will be
doing so as well. When the period is over the computer will display your earnings for that
period and your total earnings up to and including that period.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come by to answer them.
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